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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. II
LANDLORD AND TENANT-CONTINUED POSSESSION AFTER TERMI-
NATION OF LEASE-After trying to have the defendant vacate the
property following cancellation of the lease, the plaintiff seeks
to enforce a lessor's privilege1 on the theory that the defendant's
continued possession for three months after termination of the
lease 2 constituted a tacit reconduction. Held, that the plaintiff
was not entitled to a lessor's privilege since there was no relation
of landlord and tenant, no reconduction having taken place; how-
ever, judgment was granted in favor of plaintiff on quantum
meruit. Monticello v. Delavisio, 191 So. 162 (La. App. 1939).
Reconduction 3 of the lease in the instant case was impossible
since Article 26894 provides that reconduction of an urban lease
takes place only in the event the lessee "continue in possession
for a week after his lease has expired, without any opposition
being made thereto by the lessor." Neither could a new lease have
been formed by implied consent, for to constitute such a contract
the requisites specified in Article 26705 must be found,, namely:
the thing, the price, and the consent.7 While the price must be
certain and determinate,8 here there is neither a price fixed by
the parties, nor one left to the award of a named third person.9
Hence, there was missing an essential element to constitute a
contract of lease.10 Also, the mere occupancy of the property does
1. Art. 2705, La. Civil Code of 1870.
2. The court assumed a contract of lease between defendant and plain-
tiff's vendor, and did not consider the alleged insanity of the defendant as
vitiating the supposed lease. However, it was pointed out that whether or
not a lease had existed, the result would be the same, since reconduction
did not take place.
3. For a complete discussion of tacit reconduction of lease, see Comment
(1939) 1 LouIsIANA LAW REvIEw. 439.
4. La. Civil Code of 1870. See also Art. 1817, La. Civil Code of 1870.
5. La. Civil Code of 1870.
6. "In all contracts there must be a union of two wills on the same
understanding and for the same purpose, and especially is this so with re-
gard to a lease, in which the thing leased and the price must be definitely
agreed on." Duckworth v. Harrison, Gunby's Dec. 58 (La. App. 1885).
7. Bonvillain v. Pelegrin, 1 La. App. 516 (1925); Jordan v. Mead, 19 La.
Ann. 101 (1867); Knapp v. Guerin, 144 La. 754, 81 So. 302 (1919); Weaks
Supply Co. v. Werdin, 147 So. 838 (La. App. 1933).
8. Art. 2671, La. Civil Code of 1870.
9. Art. 2672, La. Civil Code of 1870.
10. Paige & Wells v. Scott's Heirs, 12 La. 490 (1838); Fisk v. Moores, 11
Rob. 279 (1845); Haughery v. Lee, 17 La. Ann. 22 (1865); Gleason & McManus
v. The Sheriff, 20 La. Ann. 266 (1868); University Publishing Co. v. Piffet, 34
La. Ann. 602 (1882); McCain v. McCain Bros., 165 La. 884, 116 So. 221 (1928).
In Haughery v. Lee, supra, the occupant went into possession of the premises
with the understanding he would pay a reasonable rent. The court refused
to allow a provisional seizure of the movables because there was no lease,
the necessary element of a definite and determinate price being absent.
NOTES
not necessarily imply the relation of lessor and lessee,"' nor can
the plaintiff's actions in attempting to have the defendant vacate
the premises show an implied consent. Consequently, since there
was neither reconduction of the old lease nor the creation of a
new one by implied tenancy, the court was correct in refusing
to enforce a lessor's privilege.
Allowing the plaintiff to recover rent based on quantum
meruit was not without precedent, although the court cited no
authority. In Rodriguez v. Combes,1 2 rent was recovered at the
rate specified in the lease which had terminated, but the recov-
ery was not based on a lessor-lessee relationship, no lease being
in existence at that time. Similarly, in Adams v. Jefferson Saw
Mill Co., Ltd.,3 recovery was allowed at the rental rate of the
lease which had been terminated, though no new lease had been
created. Also, in neither case was the lessor's privilege allowed.
But in McCain v. McCain Bros.,1 4 Chief Justice O'Niell, on fail-
ing to find a contract of lease, said there could be no reconduction
and that in the absence of a lease there could be no seizure of the
movables under a lessor's lien. Although the defendants in the
McCain case had occupied the property for five years, the court
did not allow any rent or damages. From the viewpoint of equity
and justice, the more desirable result is reached in the decisions
which allow, in the absence of a lease, a quantum meruit recovery
of rent.
Although the holding in the instant case is sound, its refusal
to recognize the existence of a lessor-lessee relationship may lead
to certain anomalous results. The occupant, while being liable
for rent based on quantum meruit, would be subject to none of
the obligations and enjoy none of the rights enumerated in Ar-
ticles 2710-2726.15 On the other hand, the owner of the premises
would bear none of the obligations of a lessor and have the en-
joyment of none of the rights set forth in Articles 2692-2709.16 In
addition, the owner would be forced to evict the occupant as he
11. Jordan v. Mead, 19 La. Ann. 101 (1867); Terzia v. The Grand Leader,
176 La. 151, 145 So. 363 (1932); Weaks Supply Co. v. Werdin, 147 So. 838, 840
(La. App. 1933), wherein the court said, "It is too well settled to require
citation that occupancy alone will not imply the relation of lessor and
lessee."
12. 6 Mart. (O.S.) 275 (1819).
13. 1 Orl. App. 289 (1904).
14. 165 La. 884, 116 So. 221 (1928).
15. La. Civil Code of 1870.
16. La. Civil Code of 1870.
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would a trespasser, Act 200 of 193611 being applicable only to
lessees.18
Furthermore, it could hardly be said that the liability of the
owner for injuries to the occupant arising out of the owner's
failure to keep the premises in repair1 9 would be the same as that
owed to trespassers, who are liable only for damages but not for
rent. Although guests of such an occupant would not be in the
same position and would not be owed the same duty as is owed
a visitor of a lessee,20 would they be treated as being lawfully
upon the premises, 21 or would they be trespassers? Recovery for
injuries sustained by those rightfully on property is predicated
primarily on Articles 67022 and 232223 which deal only with the
proprietor's duty to the public in general; it therefore appears
that such guests of "trespassing" occupants could recover in the
same measure, if they be held to be lawfully on the property.
Inasmuch as the occupant is liable for rent, justice dictates that
his enjoyment of the property should extend to the recognition
of his visitors as being rightfully upon the property.
In order not to overemphasize the dangers in future litiga-
tion in consequence of this decision, it might be pointed out that
there is little likelihood of their occurrence since the period dur-
ing which such a situation might exist will ordinarily be very
short. But the problem is not entirely speculative, as evidenced
by the McCain case, where the occupancy existed for five years
without a lessor-lessee relationship being created. It is not in
alarm that the possibilities of difficulty have been alluded to. It
is only an attempt to point out that the decision, though sound,
may necessitate setting forth the rights and obligations of the
parties in such situations, since they do not properly fall into any
category of existing legal relationships.
M.M.H.
17. Dart's Stats. (1939) § 6597.
18. For a complete discussion of notice to vacate leased premises, see
Comment (1939) 2 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 161.
19. For cases involving the duty of the lessor to the lessee to keep the
premises safe, see: Allain v. Frigola, 140 La. 982, 74 So. 404 (1917); Thomson
v. Cooke, 147 La. 922, 86 So. 332 (1920); Richard v. Tarantino, 15 La. App.
311, 131 So. 701 (1931); Herbert v. Herrlitz, 146 So. 65 (La. App. 1933).
20. As to the liability of lessor for injuries sustained by visitors and
guests of a lessee, see: Badie v. Columbia Brewing Co., 142 La. 853, 77 So.
768 (1918); Thomson v. Cooke, 147 La. 922, 86 So. 332 (1920); Tablin v. Gwin,
146 So. 184 (La. App. 1933).
21. For the duty owed by owner to those lawfully on the property see
Hero v. Hankins, 247 Fed. 664 (C.C.A. 5th, 1917); Klein v. Young, 163 La. 59,
111 So. 495 (1926); Potter v. Soady Bldg. Co., Inc., 144 So. 183 (La. App. 1932).
22. La. Civil Code of 1870.
23. La. Civil Code of 1870.
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